The corrupt, like the poor, are supposedly always with us. Corruption is a species of fraud that involves violation of public or private trust. A covenant of some sort, either implied or explicit, is violated. Corruption involves betrayal, often of a third party. The corrupt buy or sell what was not supposed to be for sale-a vote, for example, or public property. They turn to personal advantage their legal status as trustees of persons or property. Or they grant only to a privileged few what is purportedly available to all or available only through open and fair competition, such as public information or access to political officeholders or charters or contracts. Or, for a price or for personal advantage, they make public what was pledged to be private, such as state secrets or confidential business information. In the Gilded Age, the corrupt explored new frontiers: they corrupted information, particularly financial information, on a scale never before possible.
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The history of the transcontinental railroads, particularly the Kansas Pacific, Northern Pacific, Texas and Pacific, Central Pacific, and Union Pacific, as well as the Southern Pacific Railroad, exemplifies the linkage between information, markets, and corruption in the Gilded Age. Neither the importance of information to financial markets nor the manipulation of that information was new in the 1870s. The brokering of credit between parties who did not know each other (by notaries in prerevolutionary France and by scriveners and lawyers in Britain) existed before either banks or financial markets.14 What was new was the scale of the markets and of the private corporations that manipulated them, the rapidity of the dissemination of information and the size of the audiences it reached, and the new technologies that made all this possible. The Gilded Age did not replace local, face-to-face markets with an international market dealing with security issues in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars; rather, it layered those markets and forged connections between them.
Culture as much as money knit the markets together, and as paradoxical as it might seem, the culture of corruption initially began with character, which was essential for trust. This was as true on Wall Street as it was in the assessments of local bankers or agents of the credit-rating firm R. G. Dun and Company. Few in the 1870s would have failed to understand Henry Villard's refusal to resign as receiver of the Kansas Pacific, appointed by a court to run the bankrupt road, as long as his character was under attack. Corporate leaders often claimed to be honest. Collis P. Huntington attributed his own and his fellow Associates' success to their obtaining "a national reputation not only as railroad builders but as honest men that watch over and protect the interest of all [the company's] stock holders however small their interest." Character among Gilded Age financiers, however, was not synonymous with honesty; it had as much or more to do with honor, dependability, forcefulness, and strength. If Huntington thought a man reliable, he said little about him, and he therefore said a lot about many people. Huntington thought the financier Jay Gould and the railwayman Tom Scott were "two of the worst men in the country," but because being a bad man did not mean being without character, he warned David Colton not to "underrate the power of Tom Scott" of the Texas and Pacific and Pennsylvania railroads, who had come "from a very small beginning by his own forces of character" to head the Penn Central, "one of the largest R[ailroad] organizations in the world.""5
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Decisions on character were a matter of information, and they were linked to other information in judgments of creditworthiness. The smaller the financial community, the greater the ability to obtain such information. Every time the Associates of the Central Pacific had to borrow money at the ornate office of the Bank of California in San Francisco, for example, they revealed information because as Huntington, by far the shrewdest of the Associates, noted, "we are but a small community there." Whenever the Central Pacific bought locally on credit and merchants discounted the railroad's notes, they gave away intelligence to the "ring" of men surrounding the bank, who, as Huntington's partner, Mark Hopkins, complained, "know all about our business here." They knew what the Associates owed, whom they owed it to, and what rates they were paying. There was "nothing but the perplexities of it" that they did not know. Lending on both discounted notes and accommodation loans-short-term notes endorsed by a borrower and by other endorsers-was precorporate; the endorsers and their estates bore the responsibility, rather than a corporation. Members of the ring did not invest in Central Pacific securities and would not take them as collateral, supplying only short-term capital. They knew too much about the large floating, or unsecured, debt of the Central Pacific. As late as 1877, Colton found that San Francisco bankers would not lend the Central Pacific or the Southern Pacific money without the personal notes of the Associates behind the loan. 16 When financiers moved into national markets, issues of character and information went with them. The center of long-term capital markets was New York City, and Collis P. Huntington moved there in the 1860s because the Central Pacific could not survive unless he, or someone like him, was present. Wall Street could seem local. When not traveling, Huntington came to work six days a week at an office at 9 Nassau Street, just off Wall Street. At 20 Nassau Street were the original offices of the Union Pacific. At 5 Nassau Street were the offices of Fisk and Hatch, the Central Pacific's bankers. The New York house of Jay Cooke and Company, the Northern Pacific's bankers, was at Broadway and Nassau Street. Henry Villard, receiver of the Kansas Pacific and eventual owner of the Northern Pacific, would join them on Nassau Street in 1876.17
Wall Street was, in fact, a hybrid. A tightly knit world, it was also the nexus between local financial worlds and the emerging virtual world of financial information, which was both national and international. Many of the same bankers who negotiated government war bonds would later undertake the marketing of railroad bonds. Jay Cooke and Company, who eventually took over the sale of Northern An investor without independent knowledge who found himself in a virtual world of financial statements, prospectuses, newspaper accounts, and market values that at once stood in for and was inseparable from the actual world of a developing nation had to trust someone. The problem of trusting strangers was as old as long-distance trade. A German banker whose client had inherited a note signed by the Central Pacific Associates, and who then tried to ascertain "the responsibility and financial ability of said parties" through American intermediaries, was a part of the older world.23 The bond market, however, overwhelmed that world of individual promissory notes with millions of pieces of printed paper. This virtual world was, then as now, temptingly easy to corrupt. Numbers and words that were supposed to stand in for certain things could be changed and still maintain their influence; news could be altered or withheld; reports could claim assets that did not exist and deny trouble that did. Altering the numbers and changing the words of the virtual world could prompt actions in the parallel, real-life universe.
Borrowing on national and international bond markets became the key to building and operating the transcontinentals, and borrowing was, as the historian Julius Grodinsky has noted, Collis P. Huntington's great skill. Huntington knew that bor-Information, Markets, and Corruption in the Gilded Age 29 was a wonderful Gilded Age moment: the financial market's equivalent of Mark Twain's comic denunciation of a man solicited for a bribe by his fictional Senator Dilworthy in The GildedAge.25
The "reckless credulity" of such investors had been carefully cultivated by powerful American corporations. The transcontinental railroads lured investors along the financial gangplank one small step at a time. Investors proceeded from government bonds, to government-secured railroad bonds, to mortgage bonds vouched for by the same people who sold the government bonds, to an array of financial instruments, and from there, potentially, into the drink. Fisk and Hatch offered Central Pacific bond issues in all their profusion and variety.26
All kinds of information influenced investment decisions, however, and the railroads could never hope to control all of it. They could not effectively conceal news of wars, droughts, crop failures, or major regulatory decisions that could affect their firms. They usually could not mask basic facts about the road: its length or bonded debt per mile. They could more effectively control information about floating debts, the financial condition of their firms (including the amount of actual capital paid in as compared to the total debt of the firm), the results of lawsuits, and minor regulatory decisions. Some audiences were harder to deceive than others-railroads could lie to investors much more easily than to the bankers who financed their short-term debts.
The example of Jay Cooke and the Northern Pacific shows how deception, character, and trust were joined. In the early 1870s Cooke attempted to forge a moral contract with investors. He would sell bonds only to investors who promised to hold them for the long term and not to use them for speculation. He offered rosy assessments of the Northern Pacific, and he never lost faith in the ultimate promise of the road. He did not, however, think that a frank assessment of the road's progress necessarily benefited either investors or the railroad. More difficult to control were newspapers. In November 1872 an exasperated Jay Cooke practically whined to his partner Harris Fahnestock that "some fellow in the Associate press has permitted a dispatch to go all over the country which is interpreted by some to mean that the N.P. has failed to pay something. We have emphatically denied this by telegraph and are preparing a circular for our agents. In his more innocent days, Huntington had thought the solution to persistently bad press was to own the papers. "It is a wonder to me," he wrote Charles Crocker in 1870, "that you do not control the Sac. [Sacramento] 'Union' and the Stockton papers." And in the 1870s the Associates did acquire papers, but by the late 1870s it was clear that openly owning a newspaper lessened its value. It was expensive. It assured attacks from rival newspapers eager to assert railroad influence over the news. It involved entanglements with importunate editors who thought that inside information on stocks and bonds always paid and begged, as E. L. Godkin did of Henry Villard, to be relieved of debt when it did not. It involved a thousand irritations. And owning a paper did not always guarantee the desired coverage. After Crocker and
